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I.

INTRODUCTION

Patent law is a varied and rapidly changing sector of law. As a result,
it is exceedingly difficult for patent attorneys to keep abreast of the changing laws and the varying interpretations that judges pass down. In the words
of two practitioners, “Trying to keep current with changes in patent law is
like trying to navigate the rooms of a carnival fun house.”1
One of the most confusing aspects of patent law is the doctrine of inequitable conduct. This confusion stems from the courts in the Federal Circuit changing how they view the elements of inequitable conduct, that is,

1.
Janet A. Pioli & Meredith Martin Addy, The Patent Law Fun House–What
Next?, 1 NO. 1 LANDSLIDE 46, 47 (2008) (discussing recent Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit decisions in patent cases, as well as proposed reforms, and comparing them to a fun
house in that these decisions “throw IP practitioners off balance and make them wonder, as
they grab for a hand-hold, what surprises can possibly be next”).
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the changes in the element of intent and its standard,2 as well as the changes
in the element of materiality and its standard.3
This Comment addresses the doctrine of inequitable conduct, its
changes, how current interpretations of inequitable conduct by the Federal
Circuit run contrary to the principles of patent law, and the special impact
that these changes in inequitable conduct have upon a particularly affected
group: the industry of big pharmaceutical companies (“Big Pharma”). First,
this Comment briefly familiarizes the reader with the basics of patent law
and the basics of the doctrine of inequitable conduct. Second, this Comment
discusses the elements of inequitable conduct and its meaning, including its
role as a defense in patent infringement cases and what results come from a
finding of inequitable conduct. The discussion of inequitable conduct will
involve an examination of the recent changes and trends that have led to the
present confusion in the doctrine of inequitable conduct. Third, this Comment briefly discusses the role the Federal Circuit plays in patent law. This
Comment then postulates that the current interpretations and confusion in
inequitable conduct are contrary to the major policy reasons behind patent
law. A discussion of the exemplary case of Big Pharma follows this postulation and exists as an example of an industry particularly damaged by the
current trends. This includes a discussion of why Big Pharma is in a particular situation within patent law and why they are particularly harmed by
the current trends, which make Big Pharma an example of the impacts the
current trends can have. The Comment then addresses the problems that
inequitable conduct creates for Big Pharma outside of patent law, and finally, offers potential solutions to the problem of unclear and inconsistent
holdings in inequitable conduct, and, more specifically, how to clarify the
rule so that one can ensure that one works within the law in order to enjoy
all the potential benefits of patents and the policy reasons therein.

II.
A.

AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW

A BRIEF LOOK AT PATENT LAW AND INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

Patents play an important role in our system of economics,4 as well as
our legal system. The United States Constitution grants Congress power to
2.
See, e.g., James E. Hanft & Stacey S. Kearns, The Return of the Inequitable
Conduct Plague: When “I Did Not Know” Unexpectedly Becomes “You Should Have
Known,” INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Feb. 2007, at 1.
3.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Peters, Are We Living in a Material World?: An Analysis of
the Federal Circuit’s Materiality Standard Under the Patent Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1519, 1531-39 (2008).
4.
ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.2, at 11 (5th ed.
2001).

www.niulawreview.org

2009]

CURRENT TRENDS IN INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

35

“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”5
Further, patent law serves important policy concerns. First and foremost among the policy concerns behind patent law is encouraging inventiveness.6 Due to the fact that many people can use innovative technology
without depriving others of the same usage, it is “hard to identify and prevent those who will not pay for its use from using it.”7 Thus patent law exists to protect inventors from encroachment of this nature in order to “preserve incentives to invent.”8 In fact, “[t]he principal basis for intellectual
property protection in the United States is the utilitarian or economic incentive framework. That is, intellectual property in the United States is fundamentally about incentives to invent and create.”9 A further policy concern,
as the Constitution notes, is to allow one to have secured rights in one’s
invention for a limited time.10 Finally, patent law policy protects and furthers consumer interests as well.11 Patent law makes innovation a tradable
commodity, allowing for freer communication and specialization, as well as
demanding disclosure, which allows inventors to learn from the progresses
made by one another.12 All of this can arguably benefit consumers by the
creation of better goods at lower costs. But what does it take to obtain a
patent so that one can enjoy the above benefits?
In order to obtain a patent, there must first be an invention, which can
take significant time and money.13 An applicant must then file an application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).14 And
finally, one must prosecute the patent application before the USPTO.15 An
examiner will then look into each claim made in the application to deter-

5.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
6.
See 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 1.1, at 1-2 to 1-3
(Supp. 2008).
7.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (calling intellectual property “nonrivalrous”).
8.
Id.
9.
See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 1-2.
10.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
11.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 6.
12.
Id. at 5.
13.
Keith A. Zullow & Raivo A. Karmas, Intellectual Property: Obtaining a Patent,
53.3 CEREAL FOODS WORLD 147, 147 (2008).
14.
35 U.S.C. § 111 (2000); see also Peters, supra note 3, at 1525.
15.
Zullow & Karmas, supra note 13, at 147.
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mine if a patent should be awarded.16 In order to qualify for a patent, the
invention or process must be “(1) patentable subject matter, (2) useful, (3)
novel, and (4) nonobvious.”17
In order to meet the requirement of patentable subject matter, the invention must be “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”18 As is
apparent by this statutory language, usefulness is also an essential element
of an invention in order to obtain a patent.19 Further, an applicant must fully
describe such usefulness of the invention in clear terms.20
One must also meet the element of novelty in addition to patentable
subject matter and usefulness, and, in pertinent part, in regard to novelty:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant
for patent, or (b) the invention was patented or described in
a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States.21
Therefore, if anyone else has patented or described the invention in any
country,22 or if the inventor is beaten to the patent office,23 then the invention fails to meet the threshold of novelty and is unpatentable.24

16.
Russell E. Levine et al., Ex Parte Patent Practice and the Rights of Third Parties, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1987, 1993 (1996) (detailing the process by which an examiner
determines patentability by scrutinizing an application and looking for prior art).
17.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.”).
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”).
21.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
22.
Id.
23.
35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (“[B]efore such person’s invention thereof, the invention
was made by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or . . . before
such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another inventor
who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.”).
24.
35 U.S.C. § 102.
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Finally, an applicant must ensure that the invention is nonobvious.25
Even if the invention is of patentable subject matter, useful, novel, and not
identical to prior patented material, a patent will not be issued if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains.”26
The application process also involves certain disclosures, specifically
“all information known to that individual to be material to patentability.”27
Information is considered to be material to patentability when it is not just
adding to existing information and it either establishes a prima facie case of
unpatentability or contests “a position the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing
an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii) Asserting an
argument of patentability.”28 If one fails to meet these materiality standards,
the court has a doctrine by which to punish transgressors, the doctrine of
inequitable conduct.
Inequitable conduct is a failure, during the patent application process,
to disclose any of the aforementioned material information, or submitting
false information, “with an intent to deceive.”29 This means that in order to
have a finding of inequitable conduct, two separate elements must be
proved: intent and materiality.30 If inequitable conduct is found by a court,
the result is that the patent at issue is rendered unenforceable,31 and other
closely related patents may be held unenforceable as well.32

25.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
26.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
27.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992).
28.
Id.
29.
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at 877; J.P. Stevens & Co., v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
32.
Baxter Int'l, Inc. v McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
("[I]nequitable conduct with respect to one claim renders the entire patent unenforceable.
However, where the claims are subsequently separated from those tainted by inequitable
conduct through a divisional application, and where the issued claims have no relation to the
omitted prior art, the patent issued from the divisional application will not also be unenforceable due to inequitable conduct committed in the parent application." (citations omitted)).
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INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

INTENT

Traditionally, courts have swung back and forth between requiring
clear and convincing proof of an intent to deceive33 and allowing a showing
of gross negligence where one knew or should have known of a failure to
disclose material information34 when looking for a standard to use for finding intent. Shortly before the Federal Circuit definitively clarified the intent
standard, however, courts were still allowing a standard of gross negligence
to apply.35 This standard can also be thought of as a “should have known”
standard.36 Although there may have been no actual knowledge of an invention already patented or published37 or of an invention whose differences in
subject matter with the invention being patented would have been obvious38
(“prior art”) that was material, there were circumstances which nevertheless
gave rise to a neglected duty.39 The court in FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Industries, Inc., in considering the fact that there is, in general, no duty to conduct a prior art search, rejected any defense to inequitable conduct that involved an applicant acting in a manner to avoid gaining knowledge of pertinent information, which the court noted did not happen in the case, when
it was unclear whether the examiner had looked at the prior art at issue.40 In
other words, “one should not be able to cultivate ignorance, or disregard
numerous warnings that material information or prior art may exist, merely
to avoid actual knowledge of that information or prior art.”41
The Federal Circuit finally provided what appeared to be a definitive
clarification for how one must prove intent in the case of Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.42 In Kingsdown Medical, an attorney
for Kingsdown, while submitting a continuation application,43 accidentally
33.
See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
34.
See, e.g., In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Driscoll v. Cebalo,
731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
35.
FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
36.
Id. at 526 n.6.
37.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
38.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
39.
FMC Corp., 836 F.2d at 526.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 526 n.6.
42.
863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
43.
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 201.07 Continuation Application
[R-3]
200
Types,
Cross-Noting,
and
Status
of
Application,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/0200_201_07.htm (last visited Feb.
14, 2009) (“A continuation is a second application for the same invention claimed in a prior
nonprovisional application and filed before the original prior application becomes abandoned or patented.”).
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included a rejected version of a patent claim instead of the new, approved
version.44 The district court found intent for inequitable conduct because
they held that the attorney was grossly negligent in failing to notice this
error.45 The Federal Circuit, on appeal, held that alone, gross negligence
was insufficient to prove intent to deceive.46 Instead, “the involved conduct,
viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good
faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to
deceive.”47 The Federal Circuit, using this reasoning, held that the district
court erred when it found inequitable conduct due to the inclusion of the
rejected version of a patent claim because it drew an inference of intent to
deceive from gross negligence.48 In order to overturn the case law and
precedent that had been established by prior decisions in the Federal Circuit, the portion of Kingsdown Medical declaring that gross negligence is
insufficient to show intent was heard and decided by an en banc court49
because precedent cannot be changed by a panel.50 This effectively created
a much more conservative and difficult to prove standard for finding inequitable conduct,51 thus helping to alleviate what the Federal Circuit had
coined “an absolute plague” in the field of patent law.52 This meant that one
is required to show “sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to
deceive,”53 which could “be met by direct evidence of intent, circumstantial
evidence of intent, or evidence of recklessness.”54 This created a more difficult path for showing intent to deceive than the prior gross negligence standard had laid out.
Unfortunately, this clarity has become confused in the decisions of the
Federal Circuit following Kingsdown.55 The confusion first began in 2003
with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega
44.
Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 870-71.
45.
Id. at 871-72.
46.
Id. at 876.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 875-76.
49.
Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876-77.
50.
S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
51.
This finding meant that inequitable conduct must be proven beyond gross negligence and must, at the very least, include evidence of additional circumstances that help to
show a finding of intent. Christopher Darrow & Scott R. Hansen, Defending on the Equities:
Five Equitable Defenses for Patent Litigators, 424 PLI / PAT 185, 194 (1995).
52.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
53.
Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
54.
Shashank Upadhye, Liar Liar Pants on Fire: Towards a Narrow Construction
for Inequitable Conduct as Applied to the Prosecution of Medical Device and Drug Patent
Applications, 72 UMKC L. REV. 669, 670 tbl.I (2004).
55.
Id. One author, who tackled the inequitable conduct problem as a whole, has
compiled a list, as of 2004, of all the Federal Circuit cases in the last twelve years involving
inequitable conduct. Id.
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Corp.,56 which dealt with two different findings of inequitable conduct.57
The two findings of inequitable conduct stemmed from failing to perform
all steps in an example in the specific order set forth, while using past
tense58 and characterizing prior art as being less effective than the invention
at hand—a comparison the court found to be inaccurate.59 The inventor
used the past tense to describe an experiment, giving the impression that it
had been completed when it had not.60 The court held that discussing an
experiment in a specific way using the past tense on a patent application
would make people understand that the experiment had been done exactly
in that fashion, and, therefore, a finding of intent to deceive would be
proper based on the confusion such actions would cause.61 The court further
stated that inequitable conduct was an appropriate finding in a case in
which the inventor stated that everything in the application was true, despite
having known how the past tense language would be taken and not giving a
“reasonable explanation” for that use of past tense.62 The court rejected the
argument that regardless of how the experiment had progressed it would
have worked, stating that the use of past tense, its inference of completion,
and the fact that the experiment was not completed as stated, was still determinative of intent.63
The court in Hoffman-La Roche further confused the standard when it
did not address specifically what the knowledge level of the inventor was
and instead accepted the interpretation of an expert, used by the defendant
infringer, as to what the knowledge level of the inventor was, claiming that
this established an intent to deceive.64 The court was not persuaded by the
fact that the inventor did not testify as to his own knowledge, and instead

56.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see
also Hanft & Kearns, supra note 2, at 2-3.
57.
Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1357-72; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note
2, at 2-3.
58.
Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1363-66; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note
2, at 2-3. In biotechnology patents, use of the past tense is understood to mean that action or
experiment was done, while the present tense is used to show experiments that have yet to be
done. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES, §
608.01(p) (8th ed. 2001).
59.
Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1366; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note 2, at
2-3.
60.
Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1363-66.
61.
Id. at 1363-67; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note 2, at 2-3.
62.
Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1366-67; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note
2, at 2-3.
63.
See Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d. at 1364; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note
2, at 2-3.
64.
Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1371-72; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note
2, at 2-3.
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allowed an inference from what an expert who worked with the inventor
said the inventor knew or should have known.65
The Federal Circuit further confused this issue in the case of Novo
Nordisk Pharmceuticals, Inc. v. Bio-Technology General Corp.66 The patent in this case was for a ripe human growth hormone beneficial for cell
growth and metabolism.67 The language used on the patent included phrases
such as “was purified,” “was evaluated,” and “was then treated,” despite the
fact that actions had not been performed as described.68 That means that this
case, like Hoffman-La Roche, also involved drafting and the use of the past
tense, with one difference: the inventor in this case was foreign.69 Despite
that fact, the court rejected the argument that he could not be charged with
knowledge because he was not aware of what the past tense would mean.70
The Federal Circuit held that an inventor was charged with knowledge of
the law despite the lack thereof, and then, from there, inferred that the inventor should have known of the materiality of certain information.71
The court once again clouded intent for practicing attorneys shortly after Novo Nordisk in the case of Ferring B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.72 In
this case, a patent was filed for an orally administered antidiuretic.73 Originally, the examiners were not entirely convinced of the claims that language
used in an old patent held by Ferring did not discuss oral administration but
rather discussed absorption through the walls of the mouth.74 As such, the
examiners suggested that they “obtain evidence from a non-inventor.”75 The
inventor failed to use “disinterested persons” as affiants as to the effectiveness of the invention despite being present to hear the examiners state that
they were concerned about the identity of affiants and the self-serving nature of the affiants used by the inventor.76 The Federal Circuit held that the
inventor should have known he was to use “disinterested persons,” a material fact, and thus inferred an intent to deceive.77 This is evidence that the
court once again swung back to easier standards for inequitable conduct by
using the “should have known” standard despite the court’s holding in
65.
See Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1371-72; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra
note 2, at 2-3.
66.
424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
67.
Id. at 1349.
68.
Id. at 1363.
69.
See id. at 1361.
70.
Id. at 1361-62.
71.
Novo Nordisk, 424 F.3d at 1361-62.
72.
437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
73.
Id. at 1183.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 1183-84.
76.
Id. at 1191-92.
77.
Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1191-94.
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Kingsdown Medical.78 Judge Newman, in her dissent, berated the majority
for, as she put it, “not only ignor[ing] Kingsdown . . . [but] also impos[ing]
a positive inference of wrongdoing, replacing the need for evidence with a
‘should have known’ standard.”79
The court appeared to swing back toward the Kingsdown standard in
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., an infringement case
based on Purdue Pharma’s patent on Oxycontin.80 The trial court inferred
intent from materiality81 when “Purdue failed to disclose material information because it did not inform the PTO that the ‘discovery’ was based on
‘insight’ without ‘scientific proof.’”82 This was based upon a finding that
“the lack of scientific proof of a four-fold dosage range for oxycodone was
a material fact inconsistent with statements made by Purdue to obtain allowance of the patent claims over the examiner's rejections.”83 But the Federal Circuit held, correctly, that the trial court should not have inferred intent from materiality.84 Unfortunately, right after this statement, the court
used language reopening the door by stating that “when materiality . . . is
relatively low, there are fewer bases for inferring intent from materiality
alone.”85 This sounds as though the court is saying if something were highly
material, then intent could be inferred, despite the court’s reiteration of the
error in the trial court’s analysis.86
Even more recently, the Federal Circuit seemed to use a less strict
standard of intent in the case of Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.87 This case dealt with a claim that new compositions, marketed as Lovenox, showed a large increase in half-life which would result
in lower dosages being needed in order to treat the same problems as prior
art.88 Aventis argued that this comparison was allowable to show a difference in property, not composition.89 The court, however, found that in failing to disclose that the dosage of the prior art used in the experiment was

78.

Id. at 1196 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note 2, at

79.
80.
2006).
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
at 4.
87.
88.
89.

Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1196 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir.

3-4.

Id. at 1134-35; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note 2, at 4.
Purdue Pharma, 438 F.3d at 1128.
Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1134-35.
Id. at 1135; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note 2, at 4.
See Purdue Pharma, 438 F.3d at 1135; see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note 2,
525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1342-43.
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was different; there was intent to deceive.90 The court deferred to the district court as to this finding of deceptive intent over direct testimony as to
what a non-inventor chemist meant in his very own representations made to
the examiners regarding dosages.91 This appears to be less than specific
intent, especially in light of the dissenting opinion of Judge Rader.92 Judge
Rader noted that Kingsdown was a clear response by the court to the abuse
of inequitable conduct in too many patent infringement cases.93 He articulated that “Kingsdown properly made inequitable conduct a rare occurrence” and was further discomfited by the more recent process of emphasizing materiality to the near exclusion of intent altogether.94 Judge Rader
noted that the non-inventor voluntarily revealed the error, showing a candor
that stands against a finding of deceptive intent and, when looked at in the
context of Kingsdown, the trial court’s finding of inequitable conduct
should have been overturned because such candor and actions in good faith
are inconsistent with findings of intent to deceive.95
Recently, the Federal Circuit took what might very well be a huge leap
forward.96 Following through on her dissent in Ferring B.V. v. Barr Laboratories,97 Judge Newman recently passed down a decision sending the
Federal Circuit back on the right course, which is back toward
Kingsdown.98 In light of this decision, there is hope that the doctrine of inequitable conduct will become clear once more, and further that it will return to the doctrine the Federal Circuit initially deemed to be correct.99
In this new case, Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., the court reiterated the holding in Kingsdown that “‘[t]o be guilty of inequitable conduct,
one must have intended to act inequitably’ . . . and . . . ‘[i]nequitable conduct resides in failure to disclose material information, or submission of
false material information, with an intent to deceive, and those two elements . . . must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’”100 The court
also reiterated that gross negligence is insufficient for a holding of inequitable conduct, thus reiterating the need for clearly articulated intent to deceive.101
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
dissenting).
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 1348.
Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1349-53 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1350.
Id.
Id. at 1352-53.
Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., F.3d 1181, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 876.
Abbott Labs., 544 F.3d at 1353.
Id.
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The court then proceeded to hold, on two different patents marketed as
Biaxin®XL,102 that inequitable conduct had not been established.103 The
charges were that “Abbott submitted a false declaration to the PTO, and
also that Abbott withheld from the examiner the results of certain tests after
the patent applications were filed and that were inconsistent with information in the patent applications.”104 The trial court rejected the argument that
intent could be inferred from materiality and the Federal Circuit agreed.105
As to the ‘718 patent, the court stated that clear error had not been shown to
overrule the district court’s judgment that a study was not material under
any standard.106 As for the ‘616 patent, the court’s continuation of
Kingsdown was even more clear, in that the court found that “[t]here was no
evidence of intent to deceive . . . [and further] [m]ateriality, even if found,
does not establish intent.”107 This may begin to swing the pendulum away
from the Federal Circuit having been comfortable with the idea of inferring
intent when some information was found to have been material.108 However, the Federal Circuit is subject to change,109 and while this decision
might be comforting, it is unclear as to whether this is just a blip on the
radar, or whether the Federal Circuit is actually coming back to Kingsdown.
This trend and confusion of loosening the standard for finding intent
becomes even more problematic when matched with recent trends in findings of materiality because both elements must be met. Confusion with one
element alone would make this a difficult topic, but confusion in both elements makes it nearly impossible to plan for this kind of litigation.
B.

MATERIALITY

Before the current standard for materiality was set forth in the Code of
Federal Regulations, materiality was determined by addressing whether or
not there was a “substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would
consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue
as a patent.”110 In 1992, a new version of this rule came into effect and upon
102.
Id. at 1343-44; see also U.S. Patent No. 6,010,718 (filed Apr. 11, 1997); U.S.
Patent No. 6,551,616 (filed Dec. 19, 1995).
103.
Abbott Labs., 544 F.3d at 1353-58.
104.
Id. at 1353.
105.
Id. at 1354-55.
106.
Id. at 1356.
107.
Id. at 1357.
108.
See, e.g., Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting); see also Hanft & Kearns, supra note 2, at 3-4.
109.
See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
110.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1989); Douglas R. Nemec, Current Trends in Equitable Defenses to Patent Infringement: Prosecution Laches and Inequitable Conduct, 766 PRAC. L.
INST. 1035, 1072 (2003).
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its adoption, it created a narrower definition of materiality.111 Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not allowed itself to be bound by this new,
clear definition, instead stating that the new definition was not a clear break
from the old,112 leaving themselves open to use different standards to judge
materiality.
This newer rule, breaking from the old “reasonable examiner” test, although under the same code section, designated information as material if it
“establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima
facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or . . . [i]t refutes, or is inconsistent
with, a position the applicant takes in: . . . [o]pposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the [o]ffice, or . . . [a]sserting an argument of patentability.”113 The USPTO acknowledged that this section was amended to
provide a “clearer and more objective definition” of what is considered by
the USPTO to be material.114 Unfortunately, much like the element of intent, this clarity would not remain.
While it took some time after the amending of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 for the
issue of the definition to come before the Federal Circuit,115 the definition
has still been handled, since its adoption, in a way so as to convolute it and
confuse those applying for patents.116 For instance, much like the element
of intent, the Federal Circuit has confused the issue of materiality by failing
to abide by the Code of Federal Regulations.117 The Federal Circuit has
justified these breaks from the new definition by stating that “the new standard was not intended to constitute a significant break with the previous
standard.”118
The confusion began when the court looked to the pre-1992 definition
of materiality, in light of the new standard, when it looked at the case of
Hoffman-La Roche,119 a case discussed factually earlier in this Comment,120
which involved experimental results that were claimed to have been accomplished when they actually were not.121 The court held that, “[u]nder
111.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1992); see also Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment,
Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Nemec, supra note 110, at 1073.
112.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992)).
113.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1992); Nemec, supra note 110, at 1073.
114.
Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992).
115.
Id. (stating that the new standard laid out in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 only applies to
“applications pending or filed after March 16, 1992”); see also Peters, supra note 3, at 1532.
116.
See infra notes 119-54 and accompanying text.
117.
See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1368.
118.
Id. (citing Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992)).
119.
323 F.3d at 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
120.
See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
121.
Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1363-68; see also Nemec, supra note 110, at
1074.
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the circumstances, a reasonable examiner would have wanted to know that
the patentability argument . . . was unsupported by the experimental results
cited.”122 The court did not use the current standards due to the prosecution
of this patent beginning before the new standard took effect, but still acknowledged in a footnote that if the current standards had been used to determine materiality in this case, “there would be no questions that the . . .
representations would be material.”123 The court then said that the new
standard was not intended to be a substantive break from the old “reasonable examiner” standard and was instead intended to simply clarify the old
rule.124 Why, if the Federal Circuit was dealing with the old standard, did
they give an opinion as to what the new standard meant in light of the old
standard?125 One author answered this question by stating that this action by
the court was a “clear implication . . . that the Federal Circuit does not intend to unduly restrict its analysis when judging materiality under one standard or the other.”126
The confusion continued when the Federal Circuit decided the case of
Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc.127 The inequitable conduct
in this case was based upon a failure to disclose prior applications that had
very similar technology.128 The court stated that despite typically following
USPTO standards, it had not made the decision to follow the new standards
as amended in 1992.129 Much like in Hoffman-La Roche, the court acknowledged that their holding would be the same under either the old or
new materiality standards.130 The court then proceeded to use both standards in analyzing the issue of inequitable conduct.131 This meant that they
used both the “reasonable examiner” standard and the “prima facie/inconsistent” standard set out in the newly amended 37 C.F.R. § 1.46.132
The only matter the court really clarified was what they were already obligated to do by law, namely that they would continue to use the pre-1992
“reasonable examiner” standard for patents prosecuted fully before the

122.
Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1368.
123.
Id.
124.
Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1368 (citing Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg.
2021, 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992)).
125.
Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1368.
126.
Nemec, supra note 110, at 1075.
127.
329 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
128.
Id. at 1361-62.
129.
Id. at 1364; see also Peters, supra note 3, at 1534.
130.
Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1364.
131.
Id. at 1364-68.
132.
Peters, supra note 3, at 1534.
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1992 amendment to 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.133 Unfortunately, no clarity was given
as to which standard would apply if a patent was issued after 1992.134
The Federal Circuit actually appeared to clarify the issue of when to
use which standard of materiality shortly after Dayco in its decision in
Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Services, Ltd.135 This
case dealt with a device that assisted in the ascending and descending of
staircases by those who were mobility-impaired.136 In Bruno the alleged
inequitable conduct was an assertion by the defendant infringer that there
had been an intentional withholding of prior art that could have quashed the
patent during application due to a lack of novelty.137 Specifically the argument was that Bruno had failed to disclose the existence of several “invalidating stairlifts that Bruno had submitted to the Food and Drug Administration in seeking approval to sell a stairlift covered” by a patent.138 After stating that they had “consistently referred to the definition provided in 37
C.F.R. § 1.56,”139 the court further stated that it would defer to the
“[US]PTO’s formulation at the time an application [was] being prosecuted”
in order to follow the expected standard.140 Following this reasoning, the
court used the new, amended standard that was set forth in the 1992 version
of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.141 Under this standard, the court found that the matter
in question was material, and since the court had already found intent, it
found Bruno had committed inequitable conduct.142
The reasoning and holding in Bruno143 appeared to bring the clarification that had been missing in Dayco,144 that is, what the court would do if a
patent were prosecuted after March 16, 1992.145 Dayco had already clarified
that the old rule for materiality would be used if the patent was prosecuted
before March 16, 1992,146 but now it appeared as if the court conclusively
would be using post-1992 standards if the patent was prosecuted after that
inception of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.147

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1364.
Peters, supra note 3, at 1534.
394 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1350.
Id.; see also Peters, supra note 3, at 1535.
Bruno, 394 F.3d at 1350.
Id. at 1352.
Id.; see also Peters, supra note 3, at 1535.
Bruno, 394 F.3d at 1352-53.
Id.
Id.
Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
See Peters, supra note 3, at 1535.
Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1364.
Bruno, 394 F.3d at 1352-53.
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But, once again, the clarity did not remain. This became evident when
the court heard the case of Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Machine
Works.148 This case dealt with a patent prosecuted after the 1992 amendment to 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 and an accusation of inequitable conduct based
upon multiple actions.149 Before appeal, the district court found the matters
to be material under the “reasonable examiner” standard.150 At the Federal
Circuit, the court decided that a court could use any of three standards to
find materiality: (1) variations on a but-for test that had been used before
the Code of Federal Regulations defined materiality,151 (2) the “reasonable
examiner” standard, or (3) the post-1992 amended standard.152 The court
considered that the new rules have provided an alternative way to find materiality, not set a definitive rule that must be followed to the exclusion of
all others.153 The court answered the question of what the court would do if
the different standards required a higher or lower showing of materiality by
stating that they would lower the “requisite finding[s] of intent” necessary
to find inequitable conduct.154
Thus, it is difficult for any practicing attorney to anticipate which
standard of materiality the court will use, and as such, it is difficult to determine what information must, or need not be, disclosed. This leaves the
applicant submitting the patent open to challenges on inequitable conduct,
despite thinking that he or she addressed all pertinent issues to ensure good
faith and candor. This is contrary to the purpose of precedent in the legal
system as it is to ensure that later attorneys will act in the proper fashion
and later judges will have a framework for their decisions.155
148.
437 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
149.
Id. at 1312-17. The first action that led to questions of inequitable conduct was a
submission of a declaration “establishing that he had reduced his invention to practice prior
to the effective date of the prior art reference” despite having never utilized the device below
ground. Id. at 1312, 1317. The second action was when the inventor had a colleague submit
a declaration confirming the truthfulness of the inventor’s declaration. Id. at 1312-13. The
third and final action was a failure to disclose, as prior art, a patent that the inventor had
previously submitted during a prior application. Id. at 1313.
150.
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316.
151.
For an in-depth discussion of the even older standard of materiality, the three
variations of a but-for test, see Peters, supra note 3, at 1530-31.
152.
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1314-16.
153.
Id. at 1315-16.
154.
Id. at 1316.
155.
As one social anthropologist has put it,
Regularity is what law in the legal sense has in common with law in a
scientific sense. Regularity, it must be warned, does not mean absolute
certainty. There can be no true certainty where human beings enter . . .
In law, the doctrine of precedent is not the unique possession of the Anglo-American common law jurist . . . [P]rimitive law also builds on
precedents, for there too, new decisions rest on old rules of law or norms
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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Before discussing what current trends in inequitable conduct mean for
patent law, especially when looked to under the exemplary case of Big
Pharma, it is first important to have a basic understanding of the court that
hears such cases, the Federal Circuit.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was formed
on October 1, 1982, when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the
Court of Claims merged.156 The Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction
over matters such as government contracts, international trade, and, more
importantly for present purposes, patent law.157 Although specialized with
what subject matter jurisdiction it has, the Federal Circuit also hears cases
on appeal from all federal districts.158
The Federal Circuit consists of twelve judges.159 These judges are appointed by the President and subject to the consent of the Senate.160 When a
case is heard, a panel of three judges is randomly assigned to the case.161 In
other words, it is unclear which judges a practitioner will face on appeal in
front of the Federal Circuit. Thus, with different judges appearing at random162 and new judges being appointed when necessary,163 the Federal Circuit is likely to show varied opinions and changing standards. It is even
clearer that decisions by the Federal Circuit are subject to change when
precedent can be overturned when the court sits en banc.164

of custom, and new decisions which are sound tend to supply the foundations of future action.
E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL
DYNAMICS 28 (1954).
156.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: About the Court,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: About the Court,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Note, The Politics of En Banc Review, 102 HARV. L. REV. 864, 864 (1989) (“En
banc review gives all the judges on a circuit court of appeals an opportunity to reconsider a
decision rendered by a three-judge panel.”).
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CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
VIOLATE THE POLICIES BEHIND PATENT LAW

The current trends and interpretations noted above165 are adverse to the
policy reasons for the existence of patent law. As discussed previously, the
three major policy reasons for patent law are: (1) to encourage inventiveness, (2) to allow one to have secured rights in their invention for a limited
time, and (3) to protect and further consumer interests.166
The current trends have arguably created more lenient standards for
inequitable conduct, which may arguably lead to more frivolous allegations
of inequitable conduct in patent cases—the same activity that was originally
equated to a “plague.”167 A rise of frivolous allegations can be seen first in a
1998 study which estimated that inequitable conduct was charged in 80% of
patent cases, while only a small percentage were sustained.168 Another
study found that, in 2004, inequitable conduct was raised in 35% of all reported patent opinions.169 Finally, another study showed that, from 1995 to
2004, the Federal Circuit granted (found no inequitable conduct) 42% of
summary judgment motions on inequitable conduct.170 As one author noted,
this appears to show “that inequitable conduct is frequently raised when
courts find no evidence of any wrongdoing.”171 Further, one blogger performed a search of inequitable conduct on the LexisNexis electronic database of case law and found that between the years of 1993 and the time of
his posting in 2008, inequitable conduct was charged in over 2100 patent
cases—379 of which made it to the Federal Circuit.172
This rise in charges of inequitable conduct, especially in frivolous instances, could force patent holders to worry too much about litigation. It is
likely that worrying about rising litigation will deter inventors from spending their time figuring out new inventions and improving on existing ones.
This is adverse to the patent policy of protecting consumers because they
165.
See supra notes 33-154 and accompanying text.
166.
See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
167.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
168.
Committee Position Paper, The Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct and the Duty of
Candor in Patent Prosecution: Its Current Adverse Impact on the Operation of the United
States Patent System, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 74, 76 (1988).
169.
Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality:
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 156 (2006).
170.
Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 161 (2005).
171.
Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 7, 14 (2007).
172.
Posting
of
Kevin
E.
Noonan
to
Patent
Docs,
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/2008/04/new-york-times.html (Apr. 30, 2008,
23:57 EST).
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may lose out on new and improved products. This is also adverse to encouraging inventiveness because people may choose to not pursue a patent
due to uncertainty about such charges.173 Further, this could drive litigation
costs, hurting consumers who will probably feel this impact the most when
it is passed to them in the form of higher costs for consumer goods at market.
The impact of looser standards and more charges of inequitable conduct is more far reaching than just encouraging more frivolous charges. As
noted previously, less strict standards have led the Federal Circuit to find
inequitable conduct, although the Kingsdown and Code of Federal Regulations standards may not have justified such a conclusion.174 This might actually encourage patent infringement because it may be easier to find inequitable conduct. Having a “broad availability will encourage those charged
with patent infringements to search for any evidence of misrepresentation
or omissions years earlier.”175 If so, this may encourage poaching on inventions, which would clearly violate the policies of encouraging inventiveness
and securing rights for a limited time.
Further, with more findings of inequitable conduct, due to lessening
standards, which arguably means that even more patents would be held
unenforceable,176 these findings would effectively end the life of the patent.
A finding of inequitable conduct shortens the amount of time that one
would have to profit from his or her invention through a finding of inequitable conduct, which may not have occurred had Kingsdown and the Code
of Federal Regulations been more closely followed. As such, this too is
adverse to the patent law policy of ensuring rights for a limited time. More
importantly, as stated previously, this specific policy is found in the Constitution of the United States.177

173.
ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & APARNA MATHUR, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
ORGANIZATION, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT REFORM: THE DEFICIENCIES AND
COSTS OF PROPOSALS REGARDING THE APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES, POST-GRANT
AND
INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT
2
(2008),
OPPOSITION,
http://www.bio.org/reg/media/patent_reform_study.pdf (“[B]road use of the doctrine [of
inequitable conduct] will increase investor uncertainties about the value of patents which
they might finance, buy or license, discouraging the development and spread of economic
innovations.”).
174.
See supra notes 33-154 and accompanying text.
175.
SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 173.
176.
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
177.
The United States Constitution grants Congress power to “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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These current trends and their impact on patent policy can be confusing and damaging for all who wish to enforce a patent;178 however, the
harm that these current trends cause is clear when one looks at an example
of an industry particularly damaged by the current trends in inequitable
conduct: Big Pharma.

VI.

THE EXEMPLARY CASE OF BIG PHARMA

This Comment notes the changes and confusion in recent inequitable
conduct decisions passed down by the Federal Circuit, but it seems easiest
to discuss the ramifications of these decisions and their contrariness to patent law by looking at an example of an industry particularly harmed by
recent trends. As such, the following discussion entails a look at the exemplary case of Big Pharma and how it is impacted by recent trends.
A.

WHY BIG PHARMA IS A PARTICULARLY CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF AN
INDUSTRY HURT BY THE CURRENT TRENDS IN INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

There are three major reasons why Big Pharma is an example of an industry particularly impacted by recent changes in inequitable conduct and
why it is particularly harmed: (1) the already limited amount of time that
Big Pharma is able to maintain its patents, (2) the amount of money involved in pharmaceutical patents, and (3) the fierce competition and challenges that Big Pharma faces at the hands of generic pharmaceutical companies.
Patents filed on or after June 8, 1995 “begin on the date on which the
patent issues and [end twenty] years from the date on which the application
for the patent was filed in the United States.”179 Patents filed before June 8,
1995 have terms which are the greater of the twenty year term as provided
above, or seventeen years from grant.180 Patents are granted to those who
have invented a new drug that must be approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in order to send the drug to market.181 Discovering
178.
Hanft & Kearns, supra note 2, at 5 (“[T]he inventor and prosecuting attorney
must be mind-readers regarding materiality during prosecution and must stay on guard for
anything that can be the basis for inequitable conduct charges.” (emphasis added)). Further,
the current “trend fails to recognize that prosecuting attorneys generally do not monitor the
day-to-day activities of their clients” and surely more of this would be needed in order to be
aware of any and all potentially material information in order to prepare for litigation. Id.
179.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
180.
35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (2000).
181.
New
Drug
Application
(NDA),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandAppro
ved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
A New Drug Application must be filed with the FDA in order to be approved for sale and
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and fully developing a new drug, which one obtains a patent and works
towards FDA approval, takes, on average, twelve to fifteen years.182 The
natural effect of such time constraints is that “despite the standard [twenty]
year patent life, the average effective patent life for a new drug—the
amount of time where the product is sold under patent protection—is
roughly [ten] to [twelve] years.”183 Dealing with this FDA process, as well
as the time constraints therein, shows how Big Pharma is a special case
within patent law. Further, due to the fact that inequitable conduct renders a
patent unenforceable,184 thus effectively ending the time period for the
product to be sold under patent protection, and the fact that current trends
make it easier to find inequitable conduct,185 Big Pharma’s time to sell under patent protection is cut even shorter. Big Pharma already deals with a
shortened-time period due to FDA procedures and thus a finding of inequitable conduct effectively shortens an already curtailed time period. Given
the fact that Big Pharma’s period of time to sell an invention protected by
patent is cut even shorter than the typical time that an inventor enjoys patent protection, and because having exclusive rights to a patent is one of the
major policies behind patent law,186 Big Pharma is an example of an industry particularly harmed by the recent trends in the inequitable conduct doctrine as developed by the Federal Circuit.
Another pertinent reason why Big Pharma is a helpful example of an
industry particularly harmed by current inequitable conduct trends is the
sheer amount of money that is involved in the patent process of the pharmaceutical business. Even simple inventions can be fairly expensive to ob-

marketing commercially. Id. The New Drug Application should provide enough information
to the reviewer from the FDA so that he or she has enough information to decide
[w]hether the drug is safe and effective in its proposed use(s), and
whether the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks . . . [w]hether the
drug's proposed labeling (package insert) is appropriate, and what it
should contain . . . [and] [w]hether the methods used in manufacturing
the drug and the controls used to maintain the drug's quality are adequate
to preserve the drug's identity, strength, quality, and purity.
Id.
182.
Neal Masia, The Cost of Developing a New Drug, in FOCUS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RIGHTS
82,
Apr.
23,
2008,
http://www.america.gov/st/econenglish/2008/April/20080429230904myleen0.5233981.html.
183.
Id.
184.
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
185.
See supra notes 33-154 and accompanying text.
186.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The United States Constitution grants Congress
power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Id.
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tain patents for.187 But the process for Big Pharma to develop a new drug,
obtain a patent, and get it to market, currently averages approximately $1.7
billion.188 Even more amazing than this large number is the fact that “the
average expected annual return on investment from a new drug has fallen to
only 5%, and only one in six drugs will generate a return as high as
12%.”189 This means that a finding of inequitable conduct, which renders a
patent unenforceable, would end the already-shortened amount of time190
that Big Pharma has to earn this rate of return. In an industry just as impacted by the economy as everyone else,191 the limited time to make a profit
on the drug is all the more important to maintain jobs, be able to continue to
develop new drugs, and to ultimately get those drugs into the market to the
people who need them. In fact, the general director of the European Pharmaceutical Federation noted that a report put together by the European Union, which included evidence of raids at the heads of some major United
States Big Pharma companies, “acknowledges that patents are key to pharmaceutical innovation and should be protected.”192 Further, the report “acknowledges that the [pharmaceutical] industry spends more of its turnover
on R&D than any other industry sector in Europe.”193 Thus, in order to be
able to encourage innovation through research and development, profit
margins must be maintained by Big Pharma, and a shortening of the time
period for profit, by findings of inequitable conduct, would likely cut these
profit margins and dampen innovation.
Just as important as the money that Big Pharma spends, is the fact that
the United States government is under increasing pressure to lower the
187.

For instance, one patent attorney in Wisconsin informs potential clients that
[t]he cost of the entire process of obtaining a patent for a simple invention including fees payable to the Patent office and to the attorney will
be at least $6,500, assuming that your patent is allowed on a first examination. If the claims are not accepted on the first examination, the cost
will increase. The complexity of the invention will [also] increase the
cost of writing the patent.
Donald J. Ersler, Patent Process, http://www.itspatentable.com/patentprocess.html#how (last
visited Feb. 13, 2009).
188.
MICHAEL STEINER ET AL., THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: CAREER CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 23 (Fiduciary Network, LLC 2007) (on file with author).
189.
Id.
190.
See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
191.
Linda Johnson, Drug Industry Sees Big Job Cuts, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 2007,
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2007/08/03/drug_industry_sees_big_job_cuts/.
Johnson & Johnson planned to cut up to 4,800 jobs, AstraZeneca cut 7,600 jobs, and Pfizer
eliminated a very large, 10,000 jobs, a full 10% of their work force. Id.
192.
Leo Cendrowicz, Big Pharma Faces a Crackdown in Europe, TIME, Nov. 28,
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1862791,00.html.
193. Id.
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costs of health care,194 which inevitably includes pharmaceuticals. This is
evidenced by the fact that “more than 39 million senior Americans receive
their prescription drug benefits from the government, 24 million of whom
participate in the [Medicare] Part D program.”195 More startling is the cost
to the government of providing this health care to individuals, and the potential for even higher costs in the future.196 These increased costs are due
in large part to the increasing numbers of American citizens over the age of
sixty-five and the projected continuing rise of this portion of the population.197 In fact, 16% of the United States’ Gross Domestic Product is attributable to health care costs, and this number is expected to rise.198 With such
expenses facing the government and the pressure they are under to lower
their costs,199 there is fear that the government could use its considerable
power to the detriment of the pharmaceutical industry.200
Given the fact that one of the policies behind patent law is to protect
and ensure consumer interests,201 these easier standards for findings of inequitable conduct—coupled with the large amount of money already involved in the pharmaceutical industry—show an example of an industry
particularly harmed by the current trends. As costs continue to increase202
and findings of inequitable conduct, which may never have been if
Kingsdown and the Code of Federal Regulations had been more closely
followed, cut the time short for profiting on a drug, Big Pharma will likely
have to raise prices as they must constantly find pricing structures to recoup
their costs.203 For instance, “[a]s an example, for every 5000 medicines
initially evaluated, on average, only five are tested in clinical trials, and
194.
STEINER ET AL., supra note 188, at 21.
195.
Id. at 20.
196.
Id. (“The total costs in 2006 were projected to be $28 billion. By 2017, the
annual costs of the program are projected to reach almost $120 billion.”).
197.
Id. at 20-21 (“[B]y 2020 the number of people over 65 is expected to reach
almost 55 million, and by 2030 will exceed 70 million.”).
198.
Id. at 21-22.
199.
STEINER ET AL., supra note 188, at 21.
200.
Id. Steiner and others are concerned about the broad power of the government
and how they may decide to use it.
Given that the U.S. government has very broad power – through regulation and legislation – that extends even beyond its role as the largest
consumer of prescription medications, there is a risk that the pharmaceutical industry’s economics could be changed literally overnight. For example, just as it did with gasoline and beef prices in the 1970s, the government could mandate prices for certain drugs, regardless of the cost of
developing and bringing them to market.
Id.
201.
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 6.
202.
Milton Zall, The Pricing Puzzle, MOD. DRUG DISCOVERY, Mar. 2001, at 36,
available at http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/archive/mdd/v04/i03/html/03zall.html.
203.
Id.
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only one of those is approved for patient use. Accordingly, the industry
strongly believes that revenues from successful medicines must cover the
costs of the vast majority of ‘losers.’”204 Thus, the consumer is the one ultimately harmed by the combination of increasing costs, pressure to lower
prices, and the current trends in inequitable conduct.
Perhaps even more indicative of an industry particularly harmed by
current inequitable conduct trends are the interactions between Big Pharma
and generic prescription companies, and the way these interactions tie in to
inequitable conduct. To understand the impact generics, as well as their
potential for infringement cases, have on the patent process for Big Pharma,
it is first necessary to understand how the patent process is different for Big
Pharma than it is for generics.
When Big Pharma is looking for new drugs to develop and market,
“[i]ndustry scientists searching for a new drug typically must sort through
5,000 to 10,000 new chemical inventions that look promising, in order to
identify a pool of 250 compounds that then enter into preclinical laboratory
and animal testing.”205 After this narrowing down is completed, the drugs
must still undergo three phases of human testing before being considered
for patentability.206 Only one of every five compounds (out of the original
five-to-ten thousand compounds) make it through human testing, and only
one on average will be approved by the government to make it to market.207
Generic drug companies have a much easier time with profitability because
federal law allows generic drug applicants to file patent applications for the
same drug previously approved on a New Drug Application “without full
safety and efficacy testing.”208 The only “elements” that generic applicants
must meet when submitting an application for a drug, whose patent will be
expiring, are that the product must be a “bioequivalent”209 of the approved
204.
205.

Id.
Neal Masia, The Cost of Developing a New Drug, in FOCUS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 82, 82, Apr. 23, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/econenglish/2008/April/20080429230904myleen0.5233981.html.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006). This provision provided for this by allowing what
they called an “Abbreviated New Drug Application.” Id.
209.
A drug is considered to be bioequivalent of a drug if
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant
difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when
administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under
similar experimental conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses;
or (ii) the extent of absorption of the drug does not show a significant
difference from the extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar
experimental conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses and the
difference from the listed drug in the rate of absorption of the drug is in-

www.niulawreview.org

2009]

CURRENT TRENDS IN INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

57

drug and the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) must be for the
“same drug”210 as was approved on the original New Drug Application.211
Generic companies are allowed to begin this process, specifically testing
and data collection for submission to the FDA, via use of the protected drug
without having to worry about infringement thanks to “safe harbor” provisions provided by law.212
While generics have an easier time preparing to sell a drug whose patent is about to run out, there are still infringement cases, and inequitable
conduct continues to be charged.213 These ANDAs that may be submitted
by generics for drugs whose patents are approaching expiration allow generics an easier path to market.214 As such, Big Pharma and generics are no
exception to the continuous charges of inequitable conduct.215 With the
continuing ability of generics to bring up the defense of inequitable conduct
due to the easier methods of finding it, Big Pharma is yet another example
of the current trends violating patent policy. This ease of finding inequitable
conduct makes it a more enticing charge for generics to levy, thus adding to
the complication of Big Pharma’s preparations for litigation.216 This means
litigation will not only be more time consuming, but much more expensive
due to the attorney’s need to prepare for anything.217 Consequently, it will
become even more expensive and difficult for Big Pharma and their attorneys to prepare for the process of obtaining a patent and filing at the
USPTO due to the large amount of information and past experiments or

tentional, is reflected in its proposed labeling, is not essential to the attainment of effective body drug concentrations on chronic use, and is
considered medically insignificant for the drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B) (2006).
210.
The drug need not be identical. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)(I-II) (2006); 54
Fed. Reg. 28872, 28881 (July 10, 1989).
211.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006).
212.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). This extends to “all uses of patented inventions
that are reasonably related to the development and submission of any information under the
FDCA.” Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005).
213.
After all, it was the Federal Circuit itself who termed the influx of inequitable
conduct charges being raised in patent infringement cases as being “an absolute plague.”
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Federal
Circuit noted that inequitable conduct was being charged in nearly every major patent infringement case. Id.
214.
See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
215.
See infra notes 220-64 and accompanying text.
216.
The current “trend fails to recognize that prosecuting attorneys generally do not
monitor the day-to-day activities of their clients” and surely more of this would be needed in
order to be aware of any and all potentially material information. Hanft & Kearns, supra
note 2, at 5.
217.
See id.
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compounds they must account for.218 It is therefore likely that some of those
costs will be passed on to consumers as Big Pharma must maintain profit
structures.219 Thus, the impact of the relationship and ramifications between
Big Pharma and generics, both economically and legally, is another shining
example of the policy of protecting consumer interests being violated by
current trends in inequitable conduct due to increases in costs that could
likely be passed down to consumers.
Not only is Big Pharma theoretically impacted by these current trends,
but also there are several practical examples of Big Pharma being stung by
the recent trends in inequitable conduct, as seen by the cases that follow.
B.

CASES WHERE BIG PHARMA HAS FELT THE STING OF RECENT
CONFUSION IN INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

In the past fifteen years there have been forty positive findings of inequitable conduct by the Federal Circuit, fourteen of which have involved
health care or pharmaceutical companies,220 which show that Big Pharma is
a group subject to findings of inequitable conduct. The following are examples of some of the cases in which inequitable conduct has been found
against Big Pharma by the Federal Circuit.221 In these cases, one can see a
continuation of the muddled trends created by the Federal Circuit, the impacts that these decisions have, and their adversary nature to the policy reasons behind patent law.
This can first be seen in the cases discussed in previous portions of this
Comment. Specifically, the cases of Hoffman-La Roche,222 Novo Nordisk,223
Purdue Pharm.,224 and Aventis Pharm.225 are examples of the confusing
standards affecting Big Pharma.
A similar example can be seen in the case of Pharmacia Corp. v. Par
Pharmaceutical, Inc., in which the court once again veered from the
Kingsdown standard.226 This case involved an ANDA filed by Par Pharma218.
Neal Masia, The Cost of Developing a New Drug, in FOCUS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 82, 82, Apr. 23, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/econenglish/2008/April/20080429230904myleen0.5233981.html (“Industry scientists searching
for a new drug typically must sort through 5,000 to 10,000 new chemical inventions that
look promising . . . .” (emphasis added)).
219.
See supra notes 187-204 and accompanying text.
220.
Robert Pear, Patent Law Battle a Boon to Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008,
at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30patent.html.
221.
See infra notes 222-64 and accompanying text.
222.
See supra notes 56-65, 119-26 and accompanying text.
223.
See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
224.
See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
225.
See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
226.
417 F.3d 1369, 1373-75 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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ceutical for a generic of the drug Xalatan, a glaucoma medication.227 Xalatan was set to expire on March 24, 2011.228 The drug was also a fairly high
seller for Pharmacia Corp.,229 though these numbers are not as impressive
when coupled with what Pharmacia Corp. spends on research and development in a given year.230 The allegation of inequitable conduct in this case
stemmed from a failure by the patent applicant to disclose articles, written
in the past, which would have potentially undercut the level of novelty of
this drug.231 The court overemphasized the materiality element to the near
exclusion of intent.232 In fact, the court admitted, as has been done in prior
cases,233 that “[t]he more material the omission or the misrepresentation, the
lower the level of intent required to establish inequitable conduct.”234 This
meant that due to the high materiality of a mistake in a declaration made by
Pharmacia Corp.,235 intent could be inferred without really being discussed
by the Federal Circuit Court.236 This intent was inferred despite proof from
Pharmacia Corp. that the error was due to the author being a “foreign national”237 and confusing “does not” with “did not.”238 The argument was, if
the author had used “did not” the statement would have been limited to only
include the tests that had been conducted.239 While the district court rejected
this argument,240 the Federal Circuit Court did not even address it, but simply agreed with the district court that the mistake was highly material.241
Despite a purportedly good faith translation mistake,242 the court seemingly
ignored the candor of the author and found intent anyway due to the highly
227.
Id. at 1370.
228.
U.S. Patent No. 5,422,368 (filed Dec. 8, 1992), http://patft.uspto.gov (follow
“Patent Number Search” hyperlink; then run search for “5,422,368”) (last visited Sept. 20,
2009).
229.
For instance, in 2001, Pharmacia reported Xalatan as its third best-selling product at $818 million that year. L.J. Sellers, The Year 2001 Will Stand Out in any Historical
Accounting, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, May 2002, at 61, 63.
230.
Specifically, in the same year, 2001, Pharmacia spent $2.07 billion on research
and development. L.J. Sellers, The Year 2001 Will Stand Out in any Historical Accounting,
PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, May 2002, at 61, 63.
231.
Pharmacia Corp., 417 F.3d at 1373.
232.
Id. at 1370.
233.
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1135 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
234.
Pharmacia Corp., 417 F.3d at 1373 (citing Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson
Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
235.
Pharmacia Corp., 417 F.3d at 1373.
236.
Id.
237.
Id. at 1372.
238.
Id.
239.
Id.
240.
Pharmacia Corp., 417 F.3d at 1372.
241.
Id. at 1373.
242.
Id. at 1372.

www.niulawreview.org

60

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE JOURNAL

[Vol. 1

material nature of the mistake.243 Here, the finding of inequitable conduct,
and thus unenforceability, not only cut short the life of the patent by approximately six years, but also took away a significant profit generator,
which had been covering significant research and development costs. This
is yet another example of Big Pharma being affected by trends in inequitable conduct that are adverse to patent policy due to shortening their time to
enjoy patent protection as well losing profit margins, which will likely result in higher costs for consumers. Had Kingsdown and the Code of Federal
Regulations been more closely followed, it is likely that inequitable conduct
would not have been found.
Additionally, in the case of Ferring B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, discussed factually earlier,244 the court made a finding of inequitable conduct
despite not following the codified245 definition of materiality246 and going
against Kingsdown by using the should-have-known standard.247 This case
dealt with a patent for an “antidiuretically effective amount of 1-deamino-8D-arginine vasopressin (DDAVP) and a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier,” a drug used in the treatment of diabetes insipidus.248 This patent was
set to expire on September 10, 2008, seventeen years after the date of issuance.249 This was yet another case of the Federal Circuit using looser standards to make it easier to find inequitable conduct.250 The majority in this
case did not make a factual finding of materiality; instead they found materiality on a per se basis.251 The majority relies on two cases252 in order to
hold that “a declarant’s past relationships with the applicant are material if
(1) the declarant’s views on the underlying issue are material and (2) the
past relationship to the applicant was a significant one.”253 This holding is
improper, as Judge Newman notes in her dissent when she states that the
243.
Id.
244.
See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
245.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992).
246.
See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1187-90 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
247.
Id. at 1190-94.
248.
USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, Unites States Patent 5,047,398,
http://patft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearchadv.htm&r=2&p=1&f=G&l=50&d=PTXT&S1=19851217.AD.&OS=apd/12/17/1985&RS=
APD/19851217 (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
249.
Id.
250.
See supra notes 33-154 and accompanying text.
251.
See Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1187-90.
252.
The majority noted that the court had previously held that a declarant’s prior
relationships could be material and such a failure to disclose could be inequitable conduct.
Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1187-88 (citing Refac Int’l, Ltd., v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d
1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d
1182, 1191-92 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
253.
Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1188 (emphasis added).
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cases relied upon by the majority were both analyzed factually under the
Kingsdown standard.254 As Judge Newman further states, in this case, “[t]he
panel majority’s new per se rule is contrary to precedent, contrary to the
rules of evidence, and contrary to reason, as is its assertion that the omitted
relationships in this case are ‘highly material.’”255 Judge Newman also correctly notes that materiality and intent are both factual in nature and, as
such, per se findings like the one made by the majority here are improper.256 The majority further deviated from Kingsdown when they used
the gross negligence, or should-have-known, standard in finding intent to
deceive.257 The majority used the should-have-known standard despite noting that when there is no clear evidence, “intent to deceive is generally inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding a knowing failure to
disclose material information.”258 Once again, Judge Newman correctly
condemned the use of the gross negligence, or should-have-known, standard259 and reiterated that the majority has ignored Kingsdown.260 In fact,
Judge Newman notes that not only has Kingsdown been ignored as to its
holding that negligence alone is insufficient, but the majority here has not
only “restore[d] a casually subjective standard, [but] they also impose[d] a
positive inference of wrongdoing . . . from which deceptive intent is inferred, even in the total absence of evidence.”261
This case shows yet another example of a patent effectively cut short
by inequitable conduct. This is especially true in light of the fact that while
this patent was issued in 1991,262 this drug did not receive FDA approval
until September 6, 1995.263 Therefore a drug with a patent life of seventeen
years originally, was first only protected by patent for sale for twelve years,
254.
Id. at 1199 (Newman, J., dissenting).
255.
Id. at 1199-1200.
256.
Id. at 1200.
257.
Id. at 1192 (majority opinion).
258.
Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1191 (quoting Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v.
Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (second emphasis
added). It seems a bit disconcerting that the majority would quote the knowledge standard
when discussing how intent can be inferred and yet hold that should-have-known is sufficient for a finding of intent shortly thereafter. Id.
259.
Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1196 (Newman, J., dissenting).
260.
Id.
261.
Id.
262.
USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, Unites States Patent 5,047,398,
http://patft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearchadv.htm&r=2&p=1&f=G&l=50&d=PTXT&S1=19851217.AD.&OS=apd/12/17/1985&RS=
APD/19851217 (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
263.
FDA
Drug
Details
for
DDAVP,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.DrugD
etails (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
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which was then effectively cut short an additional two years by this decision.264 This is yet another example of Big Pharma being particularly
harmed by the current trends in inequitable conduct and their adversarial
nature to patent policy, specifically time protections because this finding
would arguably not have happened under a stricter adherence to Kingsdown
and the current Code of Federal Regulations.
These two cases are examples of how Big Pharma has been forced to
deal with confusion in the standards used for materiality and intent in inequitable conduct cases. These are further examples of how that confusion can
lead to findings of inequitable conduct that may not have come to be had
Kingsdown and the Code of Federal Regulations been more closely followed. These cases have also showed the nature of current trends as they
exist in connection with patent policy, and how Big Pharma is an example
of an industry particularly harmed by such trends. But the trends resulting
in finding inequitable conduct easier and more often can have more of an
impact than just at the USPTO; to see this, Big Pharma is once again a helpful example of an industry particularly harmed.
C.

THE KINDS OF PROBLEMS CURRENT TRENDS CREATE FOR BIG PHARMA

Including the practical problems listed above, such as the impact of
current trends on Big Pharma in light of time,265 money,266 and their interactions with generics,267 there are other problems that loosening standards
have arguably created for Big Pharma.
These problems are specific to the image of Big Pharma in society and
the business world. Findings of inequitable conduct carry the connotation of
“cheating,” and there are plenty of people who think that Big Pharma is
doing just that.268 As a result, more findings of inequitable conduct, which
may very well happen if the trends continue, will arguably lead to more
people viewing Big Pharma as “cheaters.”
Further evidence of societal and political impressions of Big Pharma is
found in “[m]ovies such as Michael Moore’s controversial ‘Sicko’ together
with many aspiring politicians hav[ing] demonized the industry, portraying

264.
Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1181.
265.
See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
266.
See supra notes 187-204 and accompanying text.
267.
See supra notes 205-19 and accompanying text.
268.
Debra Barrett, a vice president of generic manufacturer Teva Pharmaceuticals
said making inequitable conduct harder to find against Big Pharma “would make it easier for
them to cheat and get away with it, easier for [Big Pharma] to defend their patents and more
difficult for us to get generic products onto the market in a timely way.” Robert Pear, Patent
Law Battle a Boon to Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at C1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30patent.html.
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pharmaceutical companies as greedy and uncaring, ignoring the immense
benefits its products provide to millions of people.”269
This is even more noticeable in light of the current lobbying battle taking place over potential statutory changes in patent law.270 Further,
“[c]ompanies from almost every major industry have joined the battle.”271
This battle includes the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP),
who, among other consumer groups, wants to be able to have access to generic drugs faster, which cost as much as thirty to eighty percent less than
brand-name drugs.272 That is just one example of a group other than generic
pharmaceutical companies that are battling against Big Pharma. And can
one really blame AARP for its distrust of Big Pharma when loosened standards make it appear that Big Pharma is “cheating” more often and still
drug prices are so high? Therefore it is exemplified by the case of Big
Pharma that current trends in inequitable conduct, while adverse to patent
policy as currently interpreted, may also have an impact outside of the Federal Circuit and patent law as a whole.
But what can be done to curb the current problems, which are especially obvious in the case of Big Pharma, that recent trends in inequitable
conduct are causing?

VII.

SOLUTIONS FOR THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY CURRENT TRENDS

While there has recently been a push for new legislation and patent
law reform by both the House and the Senate,273 neither bill addresses inequitable conduct (unlike last year’s attempts at reform).274 While in the past,
the hope was to clarify many issues—which would be beneficial for anyone
worrying about patent infringement, including inequitable conduct—275 that
hope is beginning to look exceedingly desperate as those bills were ta269.
STEINER ET AL., supra note 188, at 22.
270.
Between both Big Pharma companies and the generic drug manufacturing companies, $4.3 million had been spent, as of April 30, 2008 going backwards fifteen months, on
lobbying on legislation impacting patent law. Robert Pear, Patent Law Battle a Boon to
Lobbyists,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
30,
2008,
at
C1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30patent.html.
271.
Id.
272.
Id.
273.
Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act
of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong.
(2009).
274.
The bill introduced in 2008 sought to have inequitable conduct more fully codified by making it mandatory to show clear and convincing evidence of intent to mislead or
deceive by misrepresenting, or failing to disclose some material information. See Patent
Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008).
275.
See William D. Belanger, Patent Reform Act and Case Law Updates: Impact on
Patent Litigation, 948 PLI / PAT 65, 76 (2008).
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bled.276 The goal had been to take the definition and standards of inequitable conduct out of the hands of the court, and instead provide for a doctrine
that would be governed by the USPTO via regulation.277 This would have
been highly beneficial in providing for a more black letter law approach to
inequitable conduct, an area that appears in need of just such an approach.
After all, confusion in legal precedent, including inequitable conduct, does
nothing to help our legal system.278
Since legislation regarding inequitable conduct appears to be off the
table for now, a return to the Kingsdown standard279 is ideal and ultimately
the greatest hope for the inequitable conduct doctrine. As long as the makeup of the Federal Circuit can change, so too can the opinions and decisions
of its justices.280 Nonetheless, following the standard as put forth in
Kingsdown281 and following the definition of materiality laid out in the
Code of Federal Regulations is the ultimate solution to this problem as this
appears to be an area that more black letter law would be beneficial so everyone knows how to better prepare for litigation. Perhaps the opinion laid
out in Abbott Laboratories. v. Sandoz282 and its adherence to Kingsdown,283
will encourage the Federal Circuit to follow this standard more specifically.
Since it does follow the clear standard laid out in Kingsdown, following
Abbott Laboratories would be beneficial for clarity’s sake; however, only
time will tell whether such clarity will find support in the Federal Circuit.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, current trends in inequitable conduct, as interpreted by
the Federal Circuit, arguably make it easier to find inequitable conduct, and
potentially encourage the claim to be raised more often against patent policy. Specifically, incorrect and excessive findings of inequitable conduct
lead to a shortening of time to enjoy patent protection, discourage inventiveness, and fail to protect consumer interests. This is particularly evident
in light of the exemplary case of Big Pharma. Not only has Big Pharma
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been on the convoluted end of inequitable conduct findings, feeling the
sting of such in the shortening of patents and profit margins, but they have
also suffered societal impacts at the hands of excessive charges of inequitable conduct. While Big Pharma is certainly not the only industry impacted
by current trends—and perhaps not even the only industry that could be
looked to as a particularly helpful example—they do exist as a strong example of the impact of current trends. And in order to correct all of these
issues, clarity, more than anything else, is what is needed: clarity in the
standards used to find the elements for inequitable conduct, and clarity in
the decisions and precedent as set forth by the Federal Circuit, be it through
an attempt at further legislation or by more strictly adhering to the standards
set forth in Kingsdown and the Code of Federal Regulations.
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